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Ponam pedem in aquilone, et similis ero Aitissimo 
I shall set my foot in the north, and I shall be like the most high
0- 119)
Langland after SL Augustine after Isaiah
The person who utters the proud and sublime words quoted at the head of 
this page is the Satan himself, and this fact alone tells us a lot about Langland’s 
sublime. It is indeed, to a large extent, on such upward flights of fancy that 
Longinus based his notion of the sublime, hoping to arrive at the heart of 
the mystery of artistic fame and immortality. The effects of hearing a sublime 
piece of music or poetry he describes in the following terms: “For by some 
innate power the true sublime uplifts our souls; we are filled with a proud 
exaltation and a sense of a vaunting joy, just as though we had ourselves 
produced what we had heard” 1. In eulogizing “the true sublime”, he was aware 
that there are many pitfalls in such ambitious striving, and it is easy 
to take pinchbeck for genuine gold, or to mistake the merely vulgar or 
pompous for “the true sublime” 2. But he never questioned the desirability 
and the supreme value of the sublime as the sublime. And yet for Langland 
and perhaps for the Middle Ages in general the sublime as such is already 
highly suspect, and it is suspect on moral, rather than on aesthetic, grounds. 
In the Bible the voice that is constantly harping on and exploiting man’s 
yearning for the sublime, the infinite, and the immortal is usually that of the 
devil. It is the evil one who promises immortality and omniscience to Eve in the 
Garden of Eden (Gen, 3: 4—5), and it is he again who temps Christ with
1 Longinus, “On the Sublime”, in Aristotle, Horace, Longinus: Classical Literary Criticism, ed. 
T.S. Dorsch (London: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 107.
2 Cf. Chapter 3 (Defects that Militate against Sublimity), in Longinus, “On the Sublime”, pp. 
102—103.
a vision of infinite power, having taken him onto the top of a high mountain 
(cf. St. Luke, 4: 5—8). The Satan then appears to be the master of the biblical 
and medieval sublime.
At the same time, it is clear that all those devilish tricks are performed in 
imitation of God, the true master of the sublime, and the master of promises, of 
which perhaps the most sublime is the one given by Christ from the top of the 
mountain of the Cross to one of the malefactors: “To day shalt thou be with me 
in paradise” (St. Luke, 23: 43). Longinus himself takes recourse to the “Jewish 
God”, who provides him with a classical example of the sublime, the instantly 
fulfilled sweeping promise of dispersing the darkness of the world: “And God 
said, Let there be light: and there was light” (Gen, 1: 3)3. The sublime then, 
thought of, in keeping with Longinus, as something that “transports us with 
wonder”4, or as joyful exaltation at the prospect of great promise being 
fulfilled, was no stranger to the medieval mind, on the contrary, it was, quite 
inevitably, at the very centre of the medieval, God-centred mentality.
If, however, the Middle Ages produced a ‘sublime-centred’ mentality, they 
also, by the same token, had to bring forth a heightened sense of suspiciousness 
towards the specific manifestations of the sublime, each of which could be of 
the devil’s making, meant to tempt and lead astray the faithful with a high 
promise that shall be most dismally frustrated. One of the medieval common­
places was, after all, the saying, diabolus simia Dei (the devil is an ape of God), 
but this raises immediately the question of how to distinguish, on the basis of 
Christianity, between the true and the false sublime. It is, however, essential to 
realize that this problem is of a different nature than Longinus’s dilemma of 
telling the genuine from the spurious sublime. In the latter case the failure to 
make the proper distinction leads at worst to bad, pretentious and shallow 
poetry and to a waste of time, in the former case such a failure may easily 
amount to eternal damnation. Given the infinite cunning which the evil spirit is 
reputed to have at his disposal, the Christian task of separating the wheat from 
the chaff, the clever imitation from the original, the sacred from the profane, 
appears to be rather daunting. The difference in question may, at least at first 
sight, hardly be much of a difference, as opposed to the consequences of 
overlooking it, which may be very grave indeed. It is not surprising therefore 
that we find in medieval literature, and in Piers Plowman in particular, constant 
efforts to grasp this elusive, and yet absolutely vital, difference that decides 
about man’s salvation or damnation.
Those two notions: the sacred and the profane I propose to treat as two 
aspects of the sublime, one holy, Le. official, recommendable, with clear outlines, 
and the other unholy, ie. shadowy, dubious, liable to being marginalized, stamped 
out, erased, or forgotten about. It seems that the very notion of the sublime
3Cf. Longinus, “On the Sublime”, p. 111. 
* Idem, p. 100.
implies such a duality, as is visible in the old saying attributed to Napoleon: 
“From the sublime to the ridiculous there is only one step” 5. The discourse 
of the sublime is by definition extreme, it resembles tightrope walking und thus 
may swing violently between maximal understanding and gratification to 
complete alienation — something that Longinus was already well aware of6. 
Quite significant in this respect is also the semantic slippage that took place in 
the English language on the way from the noun, pathos with the sense, 
“a quality that excites pity or sadness”, to the adjective, pathetic, which usually 
means, “arousing contempt” 7. Langland’s grappling with this problem consists 
in a long series of repeated attempts, none of which is satisfactory in the eyes of 
the author. Hence, perhaps, the air of fitfulness, the lack of the so-called logical 
development, and numerous paradoxes that typify this strange poem.
The problem of the sublime may also be approached from the point of view 
of the aesthetics, there is, namely, a certain fundamental similarity between the 
sublime and the category of the aesthetic impression as such. Both seem to 
yield the effect of easiness, and immediacy in the relationship between man and 
the Absolute, or the Other. Both also seem to bring about the opposite, but 
concomitant, effect of frustration caused by the disappointment of the great 
promises that inhere in them. As Terry Eagleton has remarked:
The aesthetics offers the middle class a superbly versatile mode of their political 
aspirations, exemplifying new forms of autonomy and self-determination, transforming 
the relations between law and desire, morality and knowledge, recasting the links 
between individual and totality, and revising social relations on the basis of custom, 
affection and sympathy. On the other hand, the aesthetic signifiers what Max 
Horkheimer has called a kind of ‘internalised repression’, inserting social power more 
deeply into the very bodies of those it subjugates, and so operating as a supremely 
■ effective mode of political hegemony8.
Thus, an ideology that accentuates the importance of the aesthetic side of 
life would, by the same token, be committed to a celebration of ‘brotherly love’ 
and, generally, of warm relations between people. It would also be committed 
to the individual’s ‘self-determination’, and would regard with a lot of suspicion 
any attempts to ‘determine’ an individual ‘from above’, i.e. by all sorts of 
traditional or institutional authorities, such as the state, or the church, and by
5Cf. J. M. & M.J. Cohen, Dictionary o f Quotations (London: Penguin Books, I960), p. 268.
6 Cf. Longinus, “On the Sublime”, p. 103, where he berates the “false sublime” in the following 
terms:
This is misplaced, hollow emotionalism where emotion is not called for, or immoderate passion where restraint is 
w hat is needed. For writers are often carried away, as though by drunkenness, into outbursts of emotion which are
no t relevant to  the matter in hand, but are wholly personal, and hence tedious. T o  hearers unaffected by this
emotionalism their work therefore seems atrocious, and naturally enough, for while they are themselves in an  ecstasy, 
their hearers are n o t
; 7 Cf. H.W. Fowler, F.G. Fowler, R.E. Allen, The Concise Oxford Dictionary o f Current English. 
Eighth Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 872.
BT. Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 28.
the people who happen to concentrate most of the political power in their 
hands. The aesthetics would thus become a privileged discourse of perfect 
mediation, owing to which an individual could “translate himself’ to others, 
make himself understandable and loveable, without sacrificing any part of the 
“self’ to the dominant and oppressive ideology, i.e. without any unwanted 
intermediaries. At the same time, Eagleton argues, following Horkheimer, that 
there is some sort of a hidden pitfall in the aesthetic attitude which makes its 
partisans fall prey to the designs of the same institutionalized power, which 
manages, in a truly devilish way, to smuggle its notions into the minds of the 
independence seeking individuals and persuade them that they are their own 
notions. In such a case the mediated self would not be the “real” self, even if the 
person involved were not aware of it.
The obvious question now would be: ‘is William Langland’s outlook on life 
in any sense aesthetic?’ It would of course be unreasonable to expect a 14th- 
century author to evince any understanding of the intellectual bends and twists 
that typify our attitude to the aesthetic. And yet, it is quite obvious that the 
question of the relationship between the ethic and the aesthetic troubled his 
mind as well. The following fragment contains an attack on poetry made, 
strangely enough, by a character representing Imagination in his conversation 
with the Dreamer:
‘Amende thee while thow myght; thow hast ben warned ofte
Witth poustee of pestilences, with poverte and with angres — violence; sorrows, afflictions
And with thise bittre baleises God beteth his deere children: rods
Quern diligo, castigo.
And David in the Sauter seith, of swiche that loveth Jesus,
“Virgo tua et baculus tuus, ipsa me consolata sunt:
Although thow strike me with thi staf, with stikke or with yerde, rod 
It is but murthe as for me to amende my soule.”
And thow medlest thee with makynges — and myghtest go seye this Sauter,
dabble in verse-making 
And bidde for hem that yyveth thee breed; for ther are bokes ynowe pray; enough 
To telle men what Dowel is, Dobet and Dobest bothe,
And prechours to preve what it is, of many a peire freres, ‘prove; pair (of) friars (C )
p e n ,  10— 19)9
Langland’s, or rather Will’s (the author’s persona) ‘meddling with makings’, or 
rather ‘dabbling in verse-making’10, is treated here as, at least potentially,
9 My quotations from Piers Plowman are based on W. Langland, The Vision o f Piers 
Plowman (A  Critical Edition o f the B-text based on Trinity College Cambridge M S B. 15. 17 with 
selected variant readings, an Introduction, glosses, and a Textual and Literary Commentary), 
ed. A.V.C. Schmidt (London, Melbourne and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1978; New York: 
E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc.), all references to this work will be given parenthetically after quotations 
in the text.
10 Cf. W. Langland, The Vision of Piers Plowman, ed. A.V.C. Schmidt, p. 135.
a waste of time. Why should Langland take such a severe stand towards his 
own favourite pastime? A lot is known of course about medieval asceticism, 
and about the Christian fundamentalist distrust towards any activity in which 
the element of pure enjoyment seems to prevail over that of duty. But Langland 
provides us also with quite a ‘practical’ explanation of this problem. Poetry is 
not serious enough because it hampers the process of communication between 
the self and the supernatural Other by attracting too much attention to itself. 
This is particularly obvious when we compare poetry with prayer, the latter 
being much more clearly than the former ‘a means to an end’. The relationship 
between God and man is likened here, in a very traditional manner, to the one 
between father and child, which means that the expected ‘direct’ way of address 
must be,- for the child, an act of submission, which, in this case, is also 
submission to the Dreamer’s earthly patrons who give him bread, fulfilling one 
of the chief wishes included in the Lord’s Prayer: “and give us this day our 
daily bread”. A simple and emotional prayer, conceived of as a concentrated 
expression of love, or, more precisely, of loving submission, is considered here 
a much more natural response to the challenge presented by God, than the 
elaborate composition of poetry that is likely to divert the poet’s attention from 
‘heavenly matters’ and lead to his getting ‘bogged down’ in the intricacies of the 
poetic craft, or in the largely irrelevant, from a ‘spiritualist’ point of view, 
details of a realistic presentation.
In taking such an attitude Langland resembles Horkheimer and Eagleton 
in their mistrust towards the cult of beauty. All of them ‘smell a rat’ in the 
aesthetic outlook, suspecting that it could be a bait which they are invited to 
swallow, as a result of which they would be held in bondage by various ‘powers 
of darkness’, whether they be ‘the military-industrial complex’, or the devil 
— ‘the prince of this world’. Of course, Langland’s motivation is very different 
from that of the above mentioned Marxist critics. He does not suspect art simply 
because it may breed an ideological submissiveness — having nothing against 
the very principle of submission, he fears that his indulgence in poetry may cause 
him to serve other masters than the ones he feels he should be loyal to.
We may find that the act of writing a book is suspect for Langland also on 
another count if we remember Langland’s interjection: ‘aren’t there enough 
books’? [‘for ther are bokes ynove’]. These words are a trifle surprising if we 
consider that books in the 14th century were rather uncommon and highly 
treasured possessions. Of course Langland does not want to say that there exist 
enough copies of books, but rather that enough books have been composed. 
The Middle Ages apparently knew little of the modern notion of the infinite 
progress of knowledge, in which every new generation has a chance radically to 
improve, widen, or revise the intellectual legacy of their forbears. J.A. Burrow, 
writing about the medieval concept of the author, connects it with the derived 
notion of ‘authority’ and with the etymology of the word ‘author’, meaning 
originally ‘the one who increases, or augments’:
Authority belongs to the auctor — an honorific title ... To be an auctor is to augment 
the knowledge and wisdom of humanity (both words derive from Latin augere 
‘increase’); and few latter-day writes can claim as much. The great auctores of the past, 
Christian and pagan, have already said almost everything there is to say11.
It is quite clear that such a perception of the author comes close to that of 
God, as is also visible in the superficially unemotional definition of the author 
given by St. Bonaventure, in which he compares the author proper with other 
types of writers:
There are four ways of making a book. Sometimes a man writes other’s words, adding 
nothing and changing nothing; and he is simply called a scribe (scriptor). Sometimes 
a man writes others’ words, putting together passages which are not his own; and he is 
called a compiler (compilator). Sometimes a man writes both other’s words and his own, 
but with the others’ words in prime place and his own added only for purpose of 
clarification; and he is called not an author but a commentator (commentator). Sometimes 
a man writes both his own words and others’, but with his own in prime place and others’ 
added only for purpose of confirmation; and he should be called an author (auctor)12.
The author is then somebody who differs from the ‘scriptor’ in almost the 
same way as the Creator differs from His creation, inasmuch as all creations, in 
the medieval eyes, were but reflections of the eternal verities, referring us back 
to the only ‘real’ Creation, which cannot be repeated or improved upon, and to 
the Creator Himself13. To exalt the position of the author to this extent was 
bound to mean in practice that the ‘author’ became a title bestowed only on the 
‘great writers of antiquity’, whose authority (meaning here precisely the state of 
being an ‘author’ in the medieval sense) was universally taken for granted. This 
process rarely yielded positive results as it often led ultimately to a virtual 
‘mummification’ of the authors, which could be compared to the process 
whereby the original creation gods in primitive cultures started to be felt as 
distant and inaccessible, reaching the state which Mircea Eliade refers to as 
deus otiosus, ‘the idle god’14.
11 J.A. Burrow, Medieval Writers and Their Work (Middle English Literature and Their Work) 
(Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 32.
12 Quoted after J.A. Burrow, Medieval Witers..., pp. 29, 30.
13 At this point we may refer to the well-known 12th-century poem by A. de Lille:
Omnis raundi crcatura 
Quasi liber et piclura 
Nobis esl el speculum;
N ostrae vitae, nostrae mortis,
Nostri status, nostrae sorlis 
Fidele signacuium.
[“Every creature in the world is, for us, like a  book, a picture, and a mirror; it is a  faithful sign 
of our life, our death, our condition, and our fate”]
14 Cf. M. Eliade, Historia wierzeń i idei religijnych, vol. 1, trans. S. Tokarski, the original title, 
Histoire des croyances et des idees religieuses (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, 1988), p. 107.
Hence the complex nature of the danger facing Will, the narrator of Piers 
Plowman. On the one hand, his styling himself as an ‘author’, or ‘maker’ (the 
archaic English term meaning a poet which corresponds to both the etymology 
of the Greek word poetes, and the concept of the godlike poet as an ‘original 
maker’) is a presumptuous and arrogant gesture — ‘bookish’ knowledge, and 
even more, the act of writing books can easily be accused of unworthily and 
ineffectually imitating the act of Creation. For this reason, perhaps, Will talks 
self-deprecatingly of his ‘meddling in makings’, trying, as it were, to conceal the 
fact that he is actually in the business of writing an original work of art, 
which is something that few of his contemporaries in England attempted to do, 
and thus coming close to a blasphemous self-deification15. We seem to 
encounter an interesting paradox here — on the one hand, Langland
reproaches himself for his artistic leanings because they make him take
unneccessary detours and slow him down in his striving for the absolute, but, 
on the other, he is afraid of the easiness of the written word that may produce 
spurious effects behind which there will not be enough of a living or authentic 
authority.
The artistic writing then, as a means of mediation and signification, is found 
wanting as inefficient or as efficient only in a superficial way, but it does not 
mean that Langland rejects it. Having voiced his, rather conventional, 
objections, he proceeds to defend it and to defend himself as a ‘maker’:
I seigh wel he seide me sooth and, somwhat me to excuse,
Seide, ‘Caton contorted his sone that, clerk though he were,
To solacen hym som tyme — a[lso] I do whan I make: amuse; just as; versify
Interpone tuis interdum gaudia curis.
‘And of holy men I herde’, quod I, ‘how thei outherwhile sometimes
Pleyden, the pariiter to ben, [places manye].
Ac if ther were any wight that wolde me telle
What were Dowel and Dobet and Dobest at the laste,
Wolde I nevere do werk, but wende to holi chirche
And there bidde my bedes but whan ich ete or slepe’. say my prayers except
(XII, 20— 28)
The Dreamer’s argument, based first of all on the authority of the pagan writer, 
Cato, may be considered surprising as a reply to Imagination’s criticism, 
appealing to Christian orthodoxy. But the Dreamer does not want to refute 
Imagination’s claims, but only qualify them, hence he prepares an ontological 
niche for the aesthetic dimension of life, a sort of side-track, and he might have
15 At least one critic did actually compare Langland to God: ‘Like God, Langland strives to 
approach Unity through multiplicity and plenitude in his poetic cosmos’. (P. Raabe, Imitating God 
(The Allegory o f Faith in Piers Plowman B) (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 
1990) p. 168) which is not very surprising given the tradition of regarding Piers Plowman as an 
English counterpart to Dante’s Divine Comedy.
felt that to establish such a niche no more was needed than second rate 
authorities. Thus we come again across a dualistic, and ambiguous manner of 
thinking in connection with the aesthetic. The words used with reference to 
writing: “solace, gaudia, pley”, are referring to something short-lasting and not 
quite serious, something whose existence may be justified by its being merely 
a supplement of the “real thing”, a seasoning of the main course. The saints 
mentioned by Langland use some unspecified amusements, probably poetry, 
“the parfiter to ben”, which sounds like a nobilitation of art, but it seems more 
likely that in Langland’s eyes a saint’s saintliness was needed to counterbalance 
the potentially harmful effect of the artistic discourse, and turn it to a good use. 
In the final statement the Dreamer concedes that writing is his second best 
occupation he would not have to resort to if he knew with perfect certainty, 
Le. from an external authority, the rules of good life. Writing and art in general 
appear here as a having their locus in a certain zone of uncertainty and serving 
to minimize the noxious effect of that uncertainty, again as a substitute for the 
‘real’ certainty. After the state of certainty is achieved writing can be discarded 
in favour of prayer, functioning as a symbol of the “real”, apparently because it 
is spoken and is supposed to come from “the depth of one’s heart”, though in 
itself it clearly is not the whole answer to Langland’s problem of “Do-well, 
Do-bet, and Do-best”.
There is naturally a rather intimate link between ‘the aesthetic’ and 
‘the sacred’, even though to a man like Langland the common moder­
nist postulate of a ‘disinterested’ enjoyment of beauty would sound like 
a thinly covered inducement to worship false gods. By the sacred, in the 
broadest possible sense of the word, I understand a disquieting or soothing 
presence that has a basically non-pragmatic, non-utilitarian character, and 
does not lend itself easily to the operations of reason. Eagleton himself talks 
of ‘the aesthetic’ in words that could be applied to the sacred, and could 
be regarded as a good definition of the sacred, if such a definition is at all 
possible:
Within the dense welter of our material life, with all its amorphous flux, certain objects 
stand out in a sort of perfection dimly akin to reason, and these are known as the 
beautiful. A kind of ideality seems to inform their sensuous existence from within, rather 
than floating above it in some Platonic space; so that a rigorous logic is here revealed to 
us in matter itself, felt instantly on the pulses16.
Let us compare it with E. Benveniste, who, writing about the pairs of terms 
referring to the sacred in Indo-European languages, such as the Avestan 
spenta/yaozdata, the Gothic heils/weih, the Latin sacer/sanctus, or the Greek 
hieros/hagios, says the following:
16T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., p. 17.
6 “The Most Sublime Act”
The analysis of each of the testified pairs ... allows us to assume that there was in the 
prehistoric epoch a concept with two meanings — a positive one: something that is 
characterized by a divine presence, and a negative one: something which people are 
forbidden to touch17.
The two above passages seem to be informed by the same dialectic of fear and 
fascination which typifies every genuine metaphysical experience, and which we 
have already encountered while talking about the sublime and the aesthetic. 
Benveniste’s “negative aspect of the sacred” has in fact much in common with 
our understanding of the profane, seen as an ‘accursed thing’, and it 
demonstrates the closeness of the relationship between the sacred and the 
profane.
' Let us have now a look at a fragment which exemplifies Langland’s
understanding of the dialectic of the sacred — it is taken from the sermon of
Lady Church directed to the Dreamer:
And also the plante of pees, moost precious of vertues:
For hevene myght nat holden it, so was it hevy of hymself,
Til it hade of the erthe eten his fille,
And whan it hadde of this fold flessh and blood taken,
Was nevere leef upon lynde lighter thereafter,
And portatif and persaunt as the point of a nedle,
That myghte noon armure it iette ne none heighe walles
0, 152— 58)
peace; powers, virtues
eaten (C ) 
earth 
leaf; linden tree 
portable; piercing; needle 
(So) that; armour; stop
The whole imagery of the above vision of the ‘plant of Peace’ leans rather 
heavily on very obvious paradoxes, the ‘plant of Peace’ behaves in a bizarre 
fashion, it becomes the lightest when it seems to be at its heaviest, it ‘eats its fill 
of earth’, like a Gargantuan monster, only to become similar in subtlety to ‘the 
point of a needle’. Langland’s vision of the plant of Peace could be regarded as 
a bold attempt at reconciling the fundamentally hostile elements of ‘love’ and 
‘law’, i.e. of the aesthetic and the ethical18. The heaviness of the plant seems to 
symbolize the material content of peace, the fundament of lawfulness on which 
it is based, while its subsequent lightness seems to stand for the freedom and 
indeterminacy of love, without which law becomes oppressive and insipid, for: 
The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life. (2 Cor. 3: 6). At the same time, the 
earthiness of the plant may be treated as corresponding to that element of the 
sacred which is expected to satisfy the longing for “the real presence”, while its 
later, slightly unearthly, spikiness and elusiveness would be associated with the
17 E. Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions indoeuropiennes, vol. II, p. 179. Quoted 
by Ml Eliade, Historia wierzeń..., p. 135 [The translation from the Polish is mine].
18 Those notions figure prominently in the immediate context of the discussed fragment, cf. 
Piers Plowman, B, I, 147—171.
forbidding, untouchable element of the sacred, the element that we could term,
the sublime, without forgetting that it properly belongs to the zone of the
sacred, and is never far away from the obsession with “the real presence”.
There is a strange similarity between the vision of the plant of Peace and 
the description of the fall of Lucifer and the rebel angels in the same Passus I, 
who also appear to be too heavy for the heaven to hold them:
And mo thousandes myd hym than man kouthe nombre more; with; count 
Lopen out with Lucifer in lothliche forme Leapt; loathsome
For thei leveden upon hym that lyed in this manere because; believed; lied
Ponam pedem in aquilone et aquilone, et similis ero Altissimo 
And alle that hoped in myghte be so, noon hevene myghte hem holde,
But fellen out in fendes liknesse [ful] nyn dayes togideres,
Til God of his goodnesse [garte the hevene to stekie made; stick fast
And gan stable it and stynte] and stonden in quiete. cause it to rest
a ,  116—23)
The juxtaposition of those two fragments makes one realize how short is the 
conceptual and aesthetic distance between Langland’s sublime and his ‘an­
ti-sublime’ or false sublime, the consequence of which is a headlong fall instead 
of elevation. The passage also introduces the all-important topic of the “illicit 
mimesis”, an imitation that betrays, threatens, and (literally) bedevils the 
original.
A similar dialectic of a ‘positive’ and a ‘negative’ interpretation of the 
aesthetic, and, by implication, also of the sacred is one of the main themes of 
Langland’s thinking. Many fragments in Piers Plowman show that Langland 
was acutely aware of the dangers of an overly aesthetic attitude. Perhaps the 
most telling is the following one:
'The doughtieste doctour and devinour of the Trinitee, theologian
Was Austyn the olde, and heighest of the foure, (Who) was; greatest
Seide thus in a sermon — I seigh it writen ones — discourse
"Ecce ipsi Idiote rapiunt celum ubi nos sapientes in inferno mergimur” —
And is to mene to Englissh, moore ne lesse,
Am none rather yraavysshed fro the right bileve orthodox faith
Than are thise konnynge clerkes that konne manye bokes, clever; know
Ne none sonner saved, ne sadder of bileve more constant in
Than plowmen and pastours and povere commune laborers, herdsmen
Souteres and shepherdes — swiche lewed juttes unimportant, ignorant people
Percen with a Paternoster the paleys of hevene penetrate
And passen purgatorie penauncelees at hir hennes partyng
That inpariitly here knewe and ek lyvede ? incompletely
‘Ye, men knowe clerkes that han corsed the tyme cursed learned men;
That evete thei kouthe or knowe moore than Credo in Deum patrem learnt
And principally hir paternoster — many a person hath wisshed.
(X. 450—65)
The above passage is of course deeply paradoxical, it is a very learned invective 
against learning, it also an aesthetic answer to the problem of the limitations of 
the aesthetic. Paradoxical is also Langland’s ostentiatious scorn for the 
‘cunning clerks that know many books’, since he certainly could be considered 
one of them, just as St. Augustine, in the quotation adduced by Langland, when 
condemning ‘the wise men’, unmistakably talks of himself as one of them.
To travesty the famous dictum of Alexander Pope, we might conclude that 
what our author seems to be saying here is that ‘a lot of learning is a dangerous 
thing’, dangerous because it can make you become satisfied with ‘the second best’, 
with the superficial, purely aesthetic — because useless, or not immediately useful, 
perfection of language, and of abstract concepts. Langland’s criterion of usefulness 
has naturally little or nothing to do with what we might call practical or material 
profit, he talks all the time sub specie aeternitatis (under the aspect of eternity), 
truly useful for him are only those things of which it may be said that they are 
essential for an individual’s eternal salvation, re. exactly aesthetic phenomena 
whose meaning is not exhausted by everyday considerations. In such circumstan­
ces it is small wonder that Langland should point to prayer as a positive aesthetic 
counterpart to the negative aesthetic phenomenon, i.e. the bookish knowledge. 
A prayer is also an aesthetic artefact, just like a book, it is made of words and has 
the status of something ‘higher’ and more ‘spiritual’ than the everyday existence. At 
the same time, the ideal prayer envisaged by Langland has the degree of warmth, 
directness and intimacy inaccessible to books and ‘makings’, and above all, it is far 
more efficient than they. Its efficiency, moreover, does not depend on the personal 
accomplishments of the person who resorts to it, a common sinner, and an 
uneducated yokel ‘can pierce with a single Paternoster to the palace of Heaven’.
Let us have a look now at a typically medieval, Le. clearly hierarchical, view 
on prayer.
You must know that there are three degrees of prayer.
There is Grst vocal prayer, either given us directly by God Himself, as the Paternoster, or 
by the Church, as matins, vespers, and the other canonical hours, or else composed by 
holy men and addressed to our Lord, our Lady, or the saints ... Generally speaking this 
kind of prayer is most suitable in the early stage of conversion ...
The second degree of prayer is vocal, but without any set formula. This is when 
a man by the grace of God feels devotion, and out of his devotion speaks to Him as 
though when he were bodily in His presence, using such words as come to mind and 
seem to be in accord with his feelings ... This kind of prayer is very pleasing to God for it 
comes straight from the heart, and for that reason it is never made in vain. It belongs to 
what I have called the second degree of contemplation.
The third degree of prayer is in the heart and without words. It is characterised by 
great peace and rest in soul and body. The man who would pray in this manner must 
have great purity of heart, for it is only possible to those who, either by long spiritual or 
bodily exercise, or else by sudden movements of love ..., have come to great inward 
peace ... This peace our Lord gives to some of his servants as a reward for their labour 
and a foreshadowing of the love which they shall have in the happiness of heaven’ 19.
19W. Hilton, The Scale o f Perfection, trans. D.G. Sitwell (London: Bums Oates, 1953) 
I, 29—30, pp. 41—42.
Hilton’s ‘scale of perfection’ in reaching heaven through prayer is not really so 
inexorably hierarchical as it might seem at the first glance, it allows for’a 
sudden movement of love’ through which we probably can attain to a tinio 
mystica (mystical union) with a single leap. It may generally be said that in the 
above passage, just as in Langland, we can observe a powerful yearning for an 
immediacy of experience, which seems to favour a movement ‘by leaps and 
bounds’, rather than a patient and painstaking clambering upwards. This 
‘yearning for immediacy’ might well be suspected of lying behind the notorious 
lack of a coherent, linear development in Piers Plowman, about which so many 
critics have complained20.
It may be profitable to compare Hilton’s degrees of prayer with St. 
Bonaventure’s distinction between the scribe, the compiler, the commentator, 
and the author (cf. p. 5). Both classifications begin with the level of strict 
imitation, the level of ‘speaking with others’ words’. From this Hilton proceeds 
immediately to the level of speaking with one’s ‘own words’, or with words 
inspired by God as a token of a special grace. This level seems to correspond to 
the highest category distinguished by St. Bonaventure, that of the author. But 
Hilton goes further, in the third degree of prayer the question of autorship 
disappears together with the question of composition and all the pain that it 
entails. The disappearance of material and conventional constraints does not 
lead, however, to a wild anarchy of any sort, but rather to an ultimate 
confirmation of the divine law, on the basis of spontaneous feeling alone.
It should not escape our notice that Langland greatly simplifies Hilton’s 
scheme, proposing, as it were, an immediate passage from ‘level one’ to ‘level 
three’, coupling a simple recitation of set prayer by an ostensibly uninitiated 
person with the truly sublime and astonishing effect of ‘piercing the heaven’. 
Langland’s ‘short-circuit’ is hard or impossible to reconcile with a hierarchical 
way of thinking, and in this respect it is far more revolutionary and 
‘anti-medieval’ than Hilton’s views. As D.M. Murtaugh has remarked:
Langland considered learning to be one species of good works, and be has his dreamer 
interpret Ecclessiastes 9:1 — “Sunt iusti atque sapientes; et opera eorum in manu dei sunt” 
— to show the tenuous relationship of both to salvation (B.X. 436—47). And so the 
damnation of Aristotle and the salvation of the good thief are adduced to show the doubtful 
relevance of good works in a scheme of salvation that seems to have been determined “in the 
legende of lif longe er I were” (B.X. 381). All human endeavor is invalidated by the economy 
of grace, and the least learned of men gain salvation with a prayer.
(B.X. 465—71).21
20 A'case in point is the statement by Pamela Raabe: ‘And yet Langland is said to distrust 
allegory, to distrust it so intensly that he cannot stop himself from continually calling attention to 
it, breaking down its similitudes, and abandoning one after another in despair of finding any that is 
adequate to express the Truth’. Cf. P. Raabe, Imitating God..., p. 10.
21 D.M. Murtaugh, Piers Plowman and the Image o f God (Gainesville: A University of Florida 
Book/The University of Florida, 1978), p. 73.
Seen from this point of view Langland is a true precursor of the most radical 
currents of the 16th-century Reformation, with its doctrine of ‘justification 
by faith’, and indeed we can see how in his mind a single act of personal faith 
outweighs all possible human merits and deserts, together with the established 
social distinctions of a class society. The ‘instant salvation’ proposed by 
Langland has, unfortunately, as its concomitant, the perspective of an 
‘instant and unaccountable damnation’ by a God who has been liberated from 
the rules of human logic and causality. It has been already been noticed that 
this line of Langland’s thinking might have been inspired by the philosophy of 
the great English nominalist thinker, William of Ockham. Such is the opinion 
of D.M. Murtaugh, who, in connection with, Piers Plowman, says the 
following:
Ockham and his followers denied the ontological status of grace as an essential 
constituent of merit, saying that it was simply a name for the fact of God’s acceptance of 
man. This, combined with the Ockhamists’ insistence on the absolute power of God, had 
a dual consequence. On earth, man’s free will was given a fuller scope in that it could 
merit God’s favour on its own. But in heaven, on the other hand, God’s absolute 
freedom meant that He could choose at random those acts and those men who would be 
pleasing to Him. The resulting indeterminism was at once exhilarating and terrifying22.
A combination of those two feelings: exhilaration and terror, may also serve as 
a good description of the medieval sublime, or even the sublime in general, and 
it may be useful to adduce here the definition of the sublime provided by 
Edmund Burke, where we can clearly observe a mixture of the elements of 
horror and irresistible fascination:
The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those causes operate most 
powerfully, is astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are 
suspended, with some degree of horror. In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its 
object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object 
which employs i t  Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that, far from being 
produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible 
force. Astonishment, as I have said, is the effect of the sublime in its highest degree; the 
inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and respect23.
The intoxicating visions of Burke and the nominalists seem be a fruit of 
a peculiar experience of minds, used to deference for hierarchic thinking, which 
suddenly envisage the possibility of taking a short cut allowing them to avoid, 
or at least shorten, albeit at a very high risk, the tortuous path upwards along 
which the weary traveller’s hope of Onaily reaching the summit is constantly
22 Ibid., p. 73.
23 E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into Our Ideas o f the Sublime and Beautiful (London; 
Longman and Co., 1812), pp. 95, 96.
frustrated by ever new vistas of a still more elevated terrain. At the end of the 
road there looms an irenic vision of an unshakeable certainty and the feeling of 
being at one with God or Nature. I feel tempted to claim that the rise of 
nominalism intensified, on the one hand, the need for the sublime, and, in the 
other, made the achievement of the sublime, in its positive sense, a much 
more hazardous and potentially traumatic affair. Such an effect was a direct 
consequence of dramatizing the ontological gap between the Creator and 
the creation, talking in semiotic terms, also between the signifier and the 
signified.
At thé same time, there is apparently little in common between the medieval 
and romantic sublime with respect to the way such lofty feelings are 
experienced. Immanuel Kant, developing his concept of the ‘dynamic sublime’, 
states the following:
To experience the dynamically sublime we must be in a position of safety: the boundless 
ocean rising with rebellious force, the high waterfall of some mighty river, and the like, 
make our power of resistance a trifling moment in comparison with their might But, 
provided our own position in secure, their aspect is all the more attractive for its 
fearfulness24.
It is quite obvious that such feelings were also familiar to medieval authors and 
audiences, (otherwise, romances and fantastic stories of all sorts would not 
have been so popular in those times) but they certainly would be considered 
too trifling and too idle for most serious writers to dwell upon. The medieval 
sublime is not so much a retrospective celebration of danger at the time of 
safety, but rather a celebration of a successfully accomplished labour at the 
time of a brief respite, it is, in a sense, a ‘poor man’s sublime’, based on less 
fastidious tastes and on more elementary needs. The motif of labour in 
connection with the sublime and the absolute did not die with Langland. 
Eagleton draws attention to this problem in his discussion of Burke:
The aesthetic experience of the sublime is confined to the cultivated few; and there 
would thus seem the need for a kind of poor person’s version of it. Religion is of course 
one obvious such candidate; but Burke also proposes another, which is, surprisingly 
enough, the lowly activity of labour. Like the sublime, labour is a masochistic afTair, 
since we find work at once painful in its exertion yet pleasurable in its arousal of 
energy... The sublime, with its ‘delightful horror’, is the rich man’s labour, invigorating 
an otherwise dangerously complacent ruling class. If that class cannot know the 
uncertain pleasures of loading a ship, it can gaze instead at one tossed on the turbulent 
ocean. Providence has so arranged matters that a state of rest becomes soon obnoxious, 
breeding melancholy and despair, we are thus naturally driven to work, reaping 
enjoyment from its surmounting of difficulties25.
• 241. Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. J.C. Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973), § 28, pp. 109—110.
25 T. Eagleton, The Ideology..., pp. 56, 57.
Eagleton seems to treat here ‘religion’ and ‘labour’ as alternative forms of the 
sublime, and is willing to call them both ‘a poor man’s sublime’, but in 
Langland the sublime is apparently capable of forming one inextricable knot 
with labour and religion, a knot where the ‘lowliness’ of labour preconditions 
and completes the ‘loftiness’ of the sublime effect, and where religion, providing 
the mediating form of prayer, serves as the necessary glue holding the two 
elements together, in keeping with the probable etymological sense of the word 
‘religion’ as derived from the Latin verb religare meaning ‘to tie’, or ‘to bind 
together’26. If we accept Langland’s point of view, the ‘poor man’s sublime’ will 
appear to our eyes as the only genuine form of the sublime, not just 
a supplement to the ‘rich man’s sublime’. Burke wrote quite a lot about the link 
between labour and the sublime:
Melancholy, dejection, despair, and often self-murder, is the consequence of the gloomy 
view we take of things in this relaxed state of body. The best remedy for all these evils is 
exercise or labour; and labour is a surmounting of difficulties, an exertion of the 
contracting power of the muscles; and as such resembles pain, which consists in tension 
or contraction, in every thing but degree. Labour is not only requisite to preserve the 
coarser organs in a state fit for their functions; but it is equally necessary to these finer 
and more delicate organs, on which, and by which, the imagination and perhaps the 
other mental powers a c t.... In all these cases, if the pain and terror are so modified as 
not to be actually noxious; if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is not 
conversant about the present destruction of the person; as these emotions clear the 
parts, whether fine or gross, of a dangerous and troublesome encumbrance, they are 
capable of producing delight; not pleasure but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of 
tranquillity tinged with terror; which, as it belongs to self-preservation, is one of the 
strongest passions. Its object is the sublime27.
It is clear that for Burke labour is a source of masochistic exhilaration as 
a one of the aspects of the Other, an exercise one occasionally takes to keep lit. 
For Langland labour is connected with the sublime and the absolute in a much 
more paradoxical way. The two coexist on the basis of the principle of 
‘extremes meet”, the urtio mystica being the rarest and the most sought after 
condition, while labour the commonest and the least attractive.
The relationship between the two may in fact break completely, as in the 
famous scene of Piers Plowman’s tearing of the papal pardon:
‘Piers!’ quod the preest tho, ‘thi pardon moste I rede;
For I shal construe ech clause and kenne it thee on Englissh’. explain
And Piers at his preiere the pardon unfoldeth — request
And I bihynde hem bothe biheld a! the bulle.
In two lynes it lay, and noght a lettre moore,
,'** Cf. Sir W. Smith and Sir J. Lockwood, Chambers Murray Latin-English Dictionary 
(Edinburgh, London: Chambers, John Murray, 1976), pp. 629, 630.
27 E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry..., p. 255 & 257.
And was iwriten right thus in witnesse of truthe:
Et qui bona egerunt ibunt in vitam eternam;
Qui vero mala, in ignem eternum.
‘Peter!’ quod the preest tho, ‘I kan no pardon fynde 
But “Do wel and have wel and God shal have thi soule”,
And “Do yvel and have yvel, and hope thow noon oother
That after thi deeth day the devel shal have thi soule!” ’
And Piers for pure tene pulled it atweyne
And seide, ‘Si ambulavero in medio umbre mortis
Non timebo mala, quoniam tu mecum es.
‘I shal cessen of my sowyng’, quod Piers, and ‘swynke noght so harde,
leave off; labour
Ne aboute my bely joye so bisy be na moore; pleasure in food
Of preieres and of penaunce my plough shal ben herafter, In; consist
And wepen when I sholde slepe, though whete bred me faille. I  lack
(V II, 105— 21)
expect nothing else 
But that
sheer anger, vexation
The meaning of this episode is highly debatable, as is evident from the 
statement by Malcolm Godden:
Piers’ action in tearing up the Pardon sent by Truth is startling; he is the servant and 
follower of Truth or God, and the Pardon has enshrined his own implicit ideals. 
Commentators have suggested that Langland means something less startling than 
appears: that Piers is to be understood as rejecting ordinary pardons by his action 
rather than Truth’s, or that tearing is really an act of acceptance, or that the tearing 
refers not directly to Truth’s Pardon but to the ending of man’s damnation by original 
sin through the Redemption28.
We seem to have here to do with one of those places where the internal logic of 
the poem breaks down, and the interpretations given above try, rather 
desperately, to salvage this logic, to preserve the coherence of the text. Piers, 
the pious labourer, can no longer reconcile the everyday toil of his humble 
vocation with the sublime reality his heart is yearning for, the mechanism of 
translating and re-translating the quotidian into the ideal, and vice versa, can 
no longer be relied upon. This mechanism is succinctly encapsulated in the 
contents of the pardon: ‘And they that have done good shall go into life 
everlasting. And they that have done evil into everlasting fire’. The scene in 
question pictures the founding gesture of the modern sublime, conceived of as 
an escape from the alienating, material and bodily side of existence. In Burke’s 
times this escape could take the from of ‘rediscovering’ labour, but in 
Langland’s times, it could only be a movement away from it, though not 
necessarily against it.
At the same time, it is worth noting that Piers’ abandonment of a labourer’s 
way of life is presented in terms that remain strictly bound up with the
28 M. Godden, The Making o f Piers Plowman (London and New York: Longman, 1990), p. 55.
agricultural imagery: Piers is talking about replacing his material plough with 
a spiritual one: “Of preieres and of penaunce my plough shal ben herafter”, and 
the very act of tearing the pardon could be seen as a metaphor of the 
fundamental agricultural gesture of cutting the soil with a plough or another 
sharp tool. We can see that the metaphor of cutting and piercing is quite 
consistently used to express Langland’s sublime.
It should not come as a surprise that Langland’s and, generally, the medieval 
sublime grows out of the spirit of prayer. The Benedictine rule ora et labora (work 
and pray) summarizes neatly a certain conceptual universe in which the way of 
labour’, Le. of a strenuous, regular effort is counterbalanced by the relatively easy 
and direct way of ‘oratio’. From an idealistic point of view, the two ways complete 
and condition each other in the same way as night and day, or a workday and 
Sunday. Characteristically, for Hilton reaching the highest degree of prayer is 
associated with the ultimate reward for labour. “This peace our Lord gives to some 
of his servants as a reward for their labour”, while in Langland’s view: “ne none 
sonner saved, ne sadder of bileve than plowmen and pastours and povere 
commune laborers” “none are sooner saved or are firmer in their faith, than simple 
ploughmen and shepherds and poor common labourers”. It seems that in the 
minds of such people like Langland and Hilton the potentially sensational 
efficiency of prayer is dialectically linked with hard physical toil, but the exact 
nature of his relationship is not so easy to decipher. On the one hand, we may 
have to do here with what might be called ‘inversely mimetic thinking’. ‘A poor 
common labourer’ is somebody whose intensity and arduousness of effort is 
inversely proportional to his social position, it is then a paradoxical or even an 
absurd creature similar to the mythical Sisyphus. It is then only natural that such 
a creature should be endowed, by way of compensation, with the gift of ‘piercing 
Heaven with his paternoster’, which is an act that constitutes a direct inversion of 
his ordinary situation and consists in getting a maximal effect, and a maximal 
elevation,, for a minimal effort. Langland’s sublime could consequently be 
described as the opposite to the Sisyphean absurdity.
It is small wonder that it is the Lord’s Prayer that proves to be the most 
efficient of all, it was considered both a prayer to God, and, in a sense. God’s 
own prayer, being the only prayer sanctioned by Jesus Christ himself, and as 
such it could be thought to control both bridgeheads of the imaginary bridge 
spanning the space between heaven and earth. The Lord’s Prayer contains thus, 
because of its content and because of its historical context, both the perspective 
of the son and that of the father, establishing a balanoe and a sort of ‘symbiosis’ 
between the two. It is for this reason that St. Thomas Aquinas calls Paternoster 
the safest of prayers29. This very epithet makes us think of prayer as, potentially,
24 St. Thomas Aquinas lays great emphasis on the authentic character of Lord’s Prayer, and 
the benefits that result therefrom. Cf. Th. Aquinas, Wykład pacierza [Exposition of the Lord’s 
Prayer], trans. M. Starowieyski (Poznań: „W drodze” Press, 1987), p. 63.
a zone of unsafety and insecurity. Striking in the medieval reflection on prayer 
is the practice of multiplying the conditions that have to be met if the prayer is 
to prove efficient and not disappointing. For example, according to Aquihas, 
a prayer should be “certain, proper, orderly, pious, and humble”, and it very 
hard to discern which things are worthy of being asked for and which are 
no t30. It is remarkable that for Aquinas the Lord’s Prayer is first of all a list of 
the things that a Christian can desire and ask for without being impious and 
committing the sin of greediness31. If then man’s greediness was considered, as 
it can easily be seen in Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale, a ‘root of all evil’, the Lord’s 
Prayer is endowed by Aquinas with the power to ‘civilize’ and to Christianize 
this potentially the most destructive and anarchic of sentiments, and to 
transform it into a positive force, serving the cause of the Father’s Kingdom.
The motif of a special significance of Paternoster appears once again in 
Passus XIV, where it functions as a miraculous piece of food that is capable of 
satisfying every desire of the faithful:
But I lokede what liflodde it was that Pacience so preisede;
And thanne was it a pece of the Paternoster — Fiat voluntas tua.
The Paternoster then, an invocation of the Father, functions then almost as 
a true farmakon32, a medicine and a poison, a means of intensifying and 
sustaining life, as well as a means of making death easier, a drug a frequent 
administering of which makes you not only forget about your material needs 
but also look forward to death in a spirit of equanimity, or even of joyful 
expectation, awaiting the glory of after-life, though stopping short of har­
bouring suicidal desires. We can notice quite clearly the necessary link that 
appears here between the truly sublime disregard for the material and the 
bodily elements of life, on the one hand, and poverty, spiritual or material, on 
the other. Such poverty is at the same time a necessary condition for an
30 Ibid., p. 63.
31 Ibid., p. 101.
32 Cf. A. Lexicon abridged from Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 751, 752.
piece; Thy will he done
Have, Haukyn’, quod Pacience, ‘and et this whan the hungreth, 
Or whan thow clomsest for cold or clyngest for drye; ai
And shul nevere gyves thee greve ne gret lordes wrathe,
Prison ne peyne — for pacientes vincunt.
By so that thow be sobre of sighte and of tonge,
In [ondjynge and in handlynge and in alle thi fyve wittes, 
Darstow nevere care for corn ne lynnen cloth ne wollen,
Ne for drynke, ne deeth drede, but deye as God liketh,
Or thorugh hunger or thorugh hete — at his wille be it.
For if thow lyvest after his loore, the shorter lif the bettre:
Si quis amat Christum mundum non diligit istum.




You need; worry about
Either... or
(XIV, 4»— 59)
efficient prayer and a fulfilment of such a prayer, as a cathartic state of sublimated 
and cleansed desires directed solely towards the unearthly goals. Langland very 
appropriately chooses as the spiritual and miraculous food the fragment of the 
Lord’s Prayer which contains the words, Fiat voluntas tua “Thy will be done”. The 
renunciation of one’s own will in favour of another’s is a central element in the 
Western thinking on the subject of the sublime, as is witnessed in the well-known 
statement by William Blake: “The most sublime act is to set another before 
you”33. God, as a father-figure, is naturally also a figure of the Other, of the 
radically different, which, for this very reason, is a standing challenge to those who 
desire to bridge this gap, and who can imagine a satisfaction of this exorbitant 
desire as achievable only through a denial of all other desires.
It might be useful to remind here St. Augustine’s stern warning that “you 
shall pray for nothing else than God Himself’34. St. Augustine turns here 
against any particularistic or fragmentary use of prayer, other than a full 
invocation of the Father and His kingdom, with the accompanying mixture of 
dread and fascination, fear of punishment and expectation of mercy. It is 
doubtful that Langland would have gone that far, he seems to accept the 
legitimacy of praying for a specific purpose, like in this case, for the end of 
a disastrous plague. But he shows the same Augustinián fear of people who 
have other aims in view than the totality of religious experience. The friars, who 
are the most common butt of Langland’s criticism, are accused here of 
toadying to rich patrons, of competing unfairly with the lay clergy, of which 
Langland is a representative, and of neglecting their teaching duties. The latter 
should include, according to the poet, telling people that they should be 
prepared to part with their possessions for a charitable purpose, and to regard 
themselves as primarily responsible for failures of all sorts.
The subject of ‘false sublime’ involves the problem of mendicant friars exactly 
because the theoretically embody the desire for the absolute founded upon piety 
and poverty. In Langland’s eyes they are but cheats and impostors. Let us have 
a closer look at the rationale on which this negative attitude seems to be based:
Whoso hath mucbe, spende manliche — so meneth Tobye — generously
And whoso litel weldeth, [loke] hym therafter, let him behave accordingly
For we have no lettre of oure lif, how long it shal dure. written assurance; last
Swiche lessons lordes sholde lovye to here,
And how he myght moost meynee manliche fynde — retainers; provide for
Noght to fare as a fithelere or a frere to seke festes, dinner-parties
Homliche at othere mennes houses, and hatien hir owene. At home; hate, shun
(X, 89—95)
33 W. Blake, “Proverbs of Hell”, in “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell”, in The Norton 
Anfhology o f English Literature, gen. ed. M.H. Abrams, vol. 2 (New York, London: W.W 
Norton & Company, 1986), p. 63.
34 ‘T he Entry Prayer”, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 18 (Chicago, London, Toronto, 
Geneve, Sydney, Tokyo, Manila: W. Benneton Publisher, 1972), p. 433.
The friars, according to Langland, have confused poverty with rootless­
ness, their existence is fundamentally frivolous, like that of fiddlers and 
other itinerant entertainers. The friar is here ontologically connected with ihe 
grasping rich man, they both exist outside the principle of ‘giving according to 
what you have received’, and they both are entirely bent on ‘receiving’ rather 
than ‘giving’, the main difference being that the rich men abandon the logic of 
giving and receiving by cutting themselves off the society of ordinary people, 
whereas ‘friars and fiddlers’ are ubiquitous, pretending to be everybody’s 
friends, while in fact bringing nobody any good.
Any reader of Piers, the Plowman, will notice the insistence with which 
Langland returns to the problem of mendicant friars, expressing at each time 
his profound hostility towards them. The following fragment allows us to have 
a glimpse at probably the deepest root of that hostility, it comes from the part 
of the poem called “The Confession of the Seven Deadly Sins”, and is spoken 
by a character representing Anger, or Wrath:
‘I am Wrathe’, quod he, ‘I was som tyme a frere, friar
And the coventes gardyner for to graffen impes. friary's; graft shoots
On lymitours and listres lesynges I ymped, lectors; grafted
Til thei bere levels of lowe speche, lordes to plese, produced; servile
And sithen thei blosmede abrood in boure to here shriftes. blossomed; bedroom(s)
And now is fallen therof a fruyt — that folk han wel levere i.e. result; much prefer 
Shewen hire shriftes to hem than shryve hem to hir persons. parish priests
And now persons han parceyved that freres part with hem, are sharing
Thise possessioner preche and deprave freres; beneficed priests; revile And
freres fyndeth hem in defaute, as folk bereth witnesse, find fault (with)
That whan thei preche the peple in many places aboute,
I, Wrathe, walke with hem and wisse hem of my bokes. teach (from)
Thus thei speken of spiritualte, that either despiseth oother, spirituality (C ); each
Til thei be bothe beggers and by my spiritualte libben, live
Or ellis al riche and ryden aboute; I, Wrathe, reste nevere
That I ne moste folwe this wikked folk, for swich is my grace fortune
(V, 135— 50)
Another fragment comes from Langland’s denunciation of the personified 
Fortune:
Coveitise of Eighes conforted me ofte into (my) thoughts
And seide, ‘Have no conscience how thow come to goode. scruples; achieve wealth
Go confesse thee to som frere and shewe hym this synnes.
For whiles Fortune is thi frend freres wol thee lovye,
And festne thee in hir fratemitee and for thee biseke secure
To hir Priour Provincial a pardon for to have,
And preien for thee pol by pol if thow be pecuniosus’. head (C);  rich; moneyed
Pena pecuniaria non sufficit pro spiritualibus delictis
PCI, 52— 58)
The charges levelled against the friars seems to hinge on the supposition that 
the friars’ way of being blurs certain fundamental borders and distinctions. In 
the first of the above fragments the allegorical figure of Anger owns up to 
having been a friar, he is above all a gossip and a talebearer, but his job is 
basically that of a gardener, ‘grafting shoots’. A grafted tree used to be 
considered by many as a violation of the laws of nature, and there was a taboo 
against eating the fruit of such a tree35. It surely was a part of a more general 
taboo against hybrids of all sorts, or creatures of mixed origin. Anger is 
a negatively mediating figure whose very status is that of a hybrid. Being 
a religious person, he flatters the gentry and gentle ladies, naturally by 
appealing to their vanity and self-love — thus he acts as an intermediary 
between the zones of the sacred and the profane, but his mediation is clearly 
weighted in favour of the profane. He also orchestrates a confrontation 
between friars and lay priests, i.e. their negative coming together, in a similar 
wfiy as he stirs mutual hate and resentment as a cook in a convent of nuns. 
Needless to add, the job of a cook has a strongly mediating character and was 
associated mainly with mixing ingredients. A cook was preparing the vitally 
important meals, but was also the most obvious person to be accused of 
poisoning his masters, in this sense, he was a powerful mediator between life 
and death. His negatively mediating nature is obvious in his calumniating 
activities which disclose secrets not for the purpose of elucidation, but rather 
that of darkening and ‘casting a shadow’. Finally, there is an element of suspect 
mediation in the very status of a medicant friar whose ‘mode of existence’ 
involves wandering around, without any due respect for the borders, such as 
the ones between parishes.
One of the most serious of Langland’s objections to the friars’ behaviour 
involves their practice of hearing the confessions of people who otherwise 
would have turned for confession to their parish priests. We may suppose, on 
the basis of the discussed fragment, that confessors derived some material profit 
from their job. It has to be realized of course that the medieval religious 
confession and penance differed quite radically from their modern con­
tinuations, penance was often long and hard, and could be connected with 
great physical exertion, like going on a long and dangerous pilgrimage, 
moreover, it was usual for the priest to withhold his absolution until the 
penance was successfully performed. The clergy could count on quite substan­
tial revenues owing to the so-called, ‘system of commutation’, which allowed 
the penitent to ‘commute’ a particularly long and arduous part of penance into 
the payment of a sum of money. This practice probably lead to the rise of the 
institution of indulgences36. It was then in the material interest of the Church
35 Cf. Leksykon symboli, ed. M. Osterreicher-Moliwo, trans. J. Prokopiuk (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo ROK Corporation SA, 1992), p. 155.
. 36 Cf. the entry ‘penance’, in The Oxford Dictionary o f the Christan Church, ed. F. L. Cross 
(Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 1059, 1060.
to impose hard penance and to guard jealously its monopoly of hearing 
confessions. The friars constitute an obvious danger to this quite elaborate 
system. They were usually people from outside whose knowledge of the 
parishioners’ life was infinitely smaller, they, as ‘birds of passage’, could not and 
would not impose any hard and long penance, let alone wait for such penance 
to be accomplished. They could, however, count on the penitents’ gratitude if 
they made the conditions of absolution less harsh. From Langland’s point of 
view, we seem to have to do here with a religious version of Gresham’s law, 
where bad confessions replace good ones, just as ‘bad money drives out good’. 
Of course the seed of corruption is contained already in the system of 
commutation, the origin of which lies is purely simoniac, with absolution 
treated as a saleable commodity. The activity of the friars is naturally 
comparable to the economic practice of dumping, the effect of which is always 
detrimental to monopolies of any sort.
Highly telling is the connection that Langland makes, in the second of the 
discussed fragments, between the friars and the allegorical figure of Fortune. 
The friars in themselves are meant to be regarded here as ‘friends of Fortune’, 
embodiments of mutability and ‘commutability’, whose other representation is 
money, or material remuneration — a notion that occupies, also as the famous 
Lady Meed, a central place in Langland’s sociological reflection. The friars’ 
vital connection with the money market begins already at the very moment 
when they decide to part company with the traditional, hierarchical society, 
and embark on their fundamentally universalist, ‘rootless’ venture, which 
involves wandering about and accepting novices irrespective of their social 
status and place of origin. This founding gesture is inseparable from the friars’ 
vow of poverty, in accordance with the old proverb: ‘a rolling stone gathers no 
moss’. And yet, paradoxically, we arrive here at the moment when the element 
of indeterminacy turns out be a link between the Franciscan poverty and the 
money oriented society of the budding capitalism. The friars’ betrayal of 
poverty would then be related to the very act of embracing it.
Langland is well aware of the complexity of the problem of friars:
‘I have yseyen charite also syngen and reden, (sc. as a priest)
Riden, and rennen in ragged wedes;
Ac biddynge as beggeris biheld I hym nevere.
Ac in riche robes rathest he once
Ac it is fern ago, in Seint Fraunceis tyme; a long while
In that secte siththe to selde hath he ben knowen. order; since then; seldom
(XV, 225—32)
Here Langland seems to come to grips with the friars’ peculiar mode of 
existence. Charity may take various shapes, it is not permanently attached to 
poverty, at least not to material poverty. Langland even goes to the length
of saying that Charity prefers to ‘walk in rich robes’, though this certainly 
should not be understood as meaning that it can be met more often among the 
rich than among the poor37. The embodiment of Charity is here in fact a figure 
of a regular monk ‘with tonsured head, a skull-cap and a fringe of crimped 
hair’. At any rate, the scandal of the friars seems to be that they are neither rich 
nor poor in the proper sense of the word, they are ‘wheedling like a beggar’, 
which, as Langland seems to suggest, does not go together with their clerical 
status, and their position of confessors to whom people turn asking for the 
absolution of sins. It is interesting that the word used in the original for 
begging is ‘bid’, which in other contexts is used for praying, which could 
suggest that friars practise a debased form of prayer, directing their desires 
downwards rather than upwards. At the same time, Langland does not forget 
about the idealistic traditions of the movement of mendicant friars, the 
traditions represented by their founder, SL Francis, although he clearly 
considers them a thing of the past.
The above examples seem to be enough for showing the consistency of 
Langland’s “metaphysical suspiciousness”. He proves himself to be a thinker 
who inveterately draws parallels between the true and the false sublime, the 
supreme good, and its disquieting dark shadow or caricature, trying to devise, 
in a series of not quite successful attempts, a reliable method for distinguishing 
between the two. His “method” seems largely to consist in trying to unmask all 
sorts of “mixed beings”, while being clearly attached to them — a task that 
certainly appealed to him much more strongly than the search for the “pure 
absolute” on which the mystics embarked. What connects, on the other hand, 
Langland with the mystics is his thinking in terms of an act of faith as means to 
reach the “instant salvation”, when all entanglements with the material world 
seem too frustrating to cope with.
37 Cf. the note made by ed. and trans. J.F. Goodridge Piers the Ploughman (London: Penguin 
Books, 1966), p. 300, n. 34,
